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Twenty years ago, depositing a paycheck at a
bank was an exercise in patience. Long lines
snaked through bank lobbies as hundreds of
customers per day waited to deposit their
money. This routine was a fact of life for every
worker, every government check recipient—
indeed, everyone who received checks regular-
ly. Today this is no longer a Sisyphean task,
and one major reason is the automated clear-
inghouse (ACH). 
ACH systems are meant to facilitate small,
repeated financial transactions between busi-
nesses and consumers. Using ACH, employers
can electronically submit paycheck deposits
directly into their workers’ bank accounts
rather than writing paper checks. Likewise,
mortgage lenders, utilities, and other business-
es that bill the same customers repeatedly can
receive payments automatically. 
Clearinghouse transactions are becoming
increasingly popular in the United States.
Electronic payments networks benefit banks, 
businesses, and consumers. Why do so few use them?
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More than 5 billion payments (including both debits and cred-
its) were made by ACH in 2000, comprising 8 percent of all
noncash transactions and 12 percent of the total dollar value of
transactions that year. Over half of American households have
the option of direct deposit available for either salaries or fed-
eral benefits payments, and this proportion has been growing
at 15 to 20 percent annually over the last several years. Eighty
percent of Americans eligible for Social Security receive their
benefits electronically, largely due to federal legislation man-
dating direct deposit for most payments made by the U.S. Trea-
sury. Direct payment of bills is still relatively less common, but
electronic transactions have been making inroads here, too;
nearly 30 percent of insurance payments and over 20 percent
of loan payments are made electronically. 
Despite this progress, ACH usage is nowhere near as high
as in Europe, where in some countries as many as two-thirds
of payments are completed electronically. Why are American
banks, businesses, and consumers so slow to adopt ACH?
THE ELECTRONIC PAYMENTS DECISION
One reason Americans might use electronic payments less fre-
quently could be that at current prices, we simply prefer checks
to electronic transactions. While check transactions are sig-
nificantly more costly for banks to process than electronic pay-
ments on a per-item basis, the prices consumers pay for bank
services typically do not reflect this. Thus, the cost of using a
check, from a consumer’s perspective, does not include the full
transaction costs as the check winds its way through the pay-
ments system. For consumers, even a free electronic transac-
tion is only slightly cheaper than a check, and checks are more
familiar and perceived as more reliable and trustworthy. And
banks fear losing customers by forcing them to abandon the
comfortable check and move toward electronic payments. As
a result, nearly 60 percent of payments are made by check.
But my recent research with Gautram Gowrisankaran shows
that low electronic payment usage may be due to more than
just preference. It may also result from the difficulty individ-
ual users face in calculating the full costs and benefits of im-
plementing a payments network, particularly in the decentral-
ized banking structure in the U.S. Market incentives may not
be sufficient to encourage users to adopt ACH, even though
ACH is cheaper than paper checks for the system as a whole.
The problem starts because joining an electronic payments
network is costly. About three-quarters of electronic payments
are made through FedLine (the Federal Reserve System’s elec-
tronic network, which among other things facilitates ACH
transactions). To participate in FedLine, financial institutions
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must invest in a dedicated PC, modem, printer, a special secu-
rity card for encryption, and special ACH processing software.
After the installation, banks must invest significant resources
in training their employees to use the system, and they must pay
a substantial monthly user fee. Furthermore, banks cannot sim-
ply abandon the old check clearing infrastructure when they
adopt ACH, since not all transactions will occur electronical-
ly. So investing in ACH results in additional expense, not a re-
placement for current expenditures.
Nonetheless, one might expect this to be a relatively simple
business investment decision: invest in an ACH network if its
benefits exceeds its costs, don’t invest if the costs outweigh the
benefits. But in this case, the costs are relatively easy to calcu-
late, whereas the benefits are not. An electronic payments net-
work increases in value as the number of other users increases.
(Economists call this a network externality.) 
In this situation, if a bank decides to adopt a particular elec-
tronic payment technology, this benefits other banks that al-
ready use it because they can then directly exchange payments
with another institution. Likewise, network customers benefit
when more patrons sign on, since this increases the acceptance
and availability of the system and helps new customers to learn
about its benefits. 
Because the benefits of electronic payments are both indirect
and constantly changing, it is impossible for banks to know how
much they will gain if they put an electronic payments network
in place. They might invest in one anyway if the cost of imple-
menting the decision were low or if they could be certain that
all of their competitors will also be joining. But the existence
of a network externality means the market provides little 
incentive for banks to join the network by themselves, since oth-
ers’ behavior affects the full return on their investment. Thus,
banks tend to delay implementing electronic payments until
they are compelled to by competition or by regulation. 
MEASURING NETWORK EXTERNALITIES
Network externalities are common for technical products and
services that improve communication. Imagine, for instance,
how useless Alexander Graham Bell’s telephone would have
been without Thomas Watson to answer it. More recently, the
expansion of the fax machine and email were both slowed by
the fact that both technologies were not very useful until they
were sufficiently widespread. Coordinating technology adop-
tion is especially difficult across businesses, particularly when
the institutions to be networked are decentralized. The deci-
sion to lay phone lines, for instance, was easier when AT&T
was the sole provider of telephone service. As a monopolist,
AT&T could much more easily calculate the benefit of ex-
tending service than if it also had to consider the
potential effects of the infrastructure investment
decisions of its competitors.
While the existence of network externalities is
clear in theory, measuring their impact has been
difficult in practice. For one thing, with high tech-
nology goods, price and costs generally decrease
over time. It is hard to identify whether increasing
demand for the product is due to the network ben-
efit from having more users or simply due to the
lower prices. The ACH system, however, provides
an opportunity to separate these effects because the
Federal Reserve’s prices are set in advance once or
twice a year and thus are less directly affected by
changes in demand. 
But measuring the benefits of ACH still requires
solving the problem of the proverbial chicken and
egg. The probability that Bank A adopts ACH is
affected by how many of its competitors also use it,
Electronic payments systems are risky investments because the
initial costs are known, but the payoff depends on user participation
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  source: Board of Governors, Federal Reserve System
Still writing checks
Increased direct depositing of paychecks and a federal mandate to disburse many payments
electronically have fueled growth in the ACH market. But ACH still lags far behind checks
in transaction volume.
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but the probability that a competitor
adopts ACH depends on Bank A’s choice.
Gowrisankaran and I dealt with this prob-
lem by asking ourselves three questions.
Are banks more likely to invest in ACH
technology if other banks geographically
near it also have ACH? Are larger banks
or banks with few local competitors more
likely to invest in ACH, since they are not
waiting for others to adopt ACH before
they adopt it themselves? And are small
independent banks more likely to adopt
ACH if a larger bank with a branch in its
geographic area has already done so?
We found evidence of network exter-
nalities in all three scenarios. A 10-per-
centage-point increase in the number of
banks with ACH capability in a local area
increases the probability of adopting ACH
by an estimated 4 to 9 percentage points
for a bank that otherwise would have had
a 50/50 chance of investing in electronic
payments technology. These results hold
even after controlling for other factors that
might influence adoption rates, like
changes in prices, differences in technol-
ogy, or trends in electronic payment usage
over time. 
POLICY IMPLICATIONS
If network externalities are significant—as our evidence sug-
gests they are—then everyone would be better off if more banks
used electronic payment networks. But while banks react to the
costs and benefits they face individually, they do not have the
information or incentive they need to also account for the in-
creasing value of the payment network as more institutions join
it. As a result, they underinvest in networking technology. 
Network externalities can also explain the difference between
European and American ACH usage. Europe’s relatively cen-
tralized banking structure makes it much easier for banks to co-
ordinate on an electronic payment system. They do not need
to worry as much that they will invest in a system that later los-
es value due to lack of participants.
Greater adoption of ACH technology would have several
other important benefits for the U.S. It would reduce the cost
of payment transactions, since electronic payments are cheap-
er to process than checks even after considering the cost of
maintaining the old check clearing system. It would foster
economies of scale in the ACH system, further reducing the
marginal cost of electronic transactions. And if more institu-
tions joined the ACH network, its value to its current partici-
pants would increase.
In a decentralized banking market like the U.S., network ex-
ternalities mean that the process of ACH adoption will likely
proceed more slowly than it would in a more centralized envi-
ronment. It could, however, be hastened by initiatives to im-
prove awareness of the benefits. For instance, in May 2003 the
Federal Reserve System will be rolling out a campaign high-
lighting the benefits of ACH for consumers and companies as
part of National Direct Deposit and Direct Payment Month.
The Fed could also foster greater coordination among banking
institutions in its supervisory and regulatory role to help over-
come the problems of a decentralized market. With these types
of efforts in place, the benefits of an electronic payment sys-
tem can be fully realized. S
Joanna Stavins is Senior Economist with the
Federal Reserve Bank of Boston. Her article,
“Network externalities and technology adop-
tion: lessons from electronic payments” (coau-
thored with Gautam Gowrisankaran), will ap-
pear in RAND Journal of Economics.
When ACH was initially developed, the Federal Reserve System stepped in to implement
a single communications standard for all transactions. But for other industries, arriving
at a common standard in the face of network externalities is more challenging. The leg-
endary battle between Betamax and VHS is a case in point. 
The first home video recording system, Betamax, was introduced by Sony in 1976;
rival Matsushita Electric came out with the Video Home System (VHS) a year and a half
later. The two product designs, though based on a common ancestor, were just different
enough that the videotapes on which material was recorded were incompatible. This set
the stage for a showdown over the home video market.
Technological improvements like increased playing time, enhanced picture quality,
and additional features came so quickly that neither product was able to establish a
definitive edge over the other in that regard. But Sony was less effective in getting other
VCR manufacturers to license its technology, and Matsushita’s simpler design and will-
ingness to incorporate licensees’ suggestions facilitated mass production. As a result,
the VHS standard began to develop a small advantage in licensing its technology to
leading color TV manufacturers—who were key to expanding the VCR market because of
the complementary nature of the products and their brand-name cachet.
Yet even in 1980, nearly 40 percent of VCRs were still Beta models. But that was
before the rise of the video rental store. Before then, most people used their VCRs to
play back television shows they had recorded themselves. For the most part, people did
not share tapes, so there was less need to have one standard tape format. 
The growth of the video rental industry, however, depended on choosing a single
standard to avoid duplication and save costs. VHS’s slight market advantage led many
stores to invest in the VHS format, believing that it would ultimately become the indus-
try standard. Sony couldn’t compete in the new environment. As a result, what started
as a small edge for VHS spiraled into market dominance. After years of declining sales,
Sony finally bowed out of the Beta market in 1988.
Did Blockbuster kill Betamax?